Continental connection flight 3407 simulation dating

In a follow-up to Flying Cheap, FRONTLINE is examining the rapid growth of contract simulation of crash Although was painted in the colors of Continental Connection, it was actually was aware of significant and repeated safety concerns at Colgan Air dating back more than a decade. Colgan Air Flight , marketed as Continental Connection under a .. tolerance in a tested simulation environment, pilots may have come to. Colgan Air Flight , marketed as Continental Connection under a codeshare agreement Date, February 12, () .. The NTSB theorized that due to this low tolerance in a tested simulation environment, pilots may have.

Until that time, the aircraft had been maneuvering normally. The de-icing system was reported to be turned on. During descent, the crew reported about 3 miles 4. Preceding the crash, the aircraft's stall -protection systems had activated. The passengers were given no warning of any trouble by the pilots. Occupants experienced an estimated force two times that of gravity just before impact. Chealander said information from the aircraft's flight data recorder indicates that the plane pitched up at an angle of 31 degrees, then down at 45 degrees.

The aircraft rolled to the left at 46 degrees, then snapped back to the right at degrees, before crashing into the house, and erupting in flames on impact.

Introduction

Investigators stated it would take three or four days to remove all human remains and a few weeks to positively identify them. As the recovery efforts proceeded, Chealander remarked that freezing temperatures as well as difficulty accessing debris were slowing the investigation.

Portable heaters had to be brought to the site to melt ice left in the wake of the firefighting efforts. Initial analysis of the aircraft's remains revealed the cockpit had sustained the greatest impact force, while the main cabin was mostly destroyed by the ensuing fireball. Towards the rear of the aircraft, passengers were found still strapped in their seats. The investigators did not find evidence of the severe icing conditions that would have required the pilots to fly manually.

Without flying manually, pilots may be unable to feel changes in the handling characteristics of the airplane, which is a warning sign of ice buildup. The NTSB also revealed that the plane crashed 26 seconds after trouble was first registered on the flight data recorder. It was reported that a re-creation of events leading up to the crash indicated that the stick pusher had activated, which pushes the nose down when it determines a stall is imminent in order to maintain airspeed so the wings continue to generate lift and keep the aircraft aloft.

Colgan Air Flight - Infogalactic: the planetary knowledge core

The crew, concerned about a nose-down attitude so close to the ground, may have responded by pulling the nose upward and increasing power, but over-corrected, causing a stall or even a spin. Renslow did have intentions of landing safely at Buffalo, as well as first officer Shaw, but obviously in those last few moments As in a previous FAA incident handling other inspectors' complaints, [61] the Colgan inspector's complaints were deferred and the inspector was demoted.

The first officer commuted from Seattle to Newark on an overnight flight. Renslow did have intentions of landing safely at Buffalo, as well as first officer Shaw, but obviously in those last few moments Some of the crew's communication violated federal rules banning nonessential conversation. Government federal whistle-blower complaints. Final report[ edit ] On February 2,the NTSB issued its final report, describing the details of its investigation that led to 46 specific conclusions.

Colgan Air Flight - Wikipedia

Among those conclusions were the fact that both the Captain and the first officer responded to the stall warning in a manner contrary to their training. The NTSB could not explain why the first officer retracted the flaps and suggested that the landing gear should also be retracted, though it did find that the current approach-stall training was not adequate: The current air carrier approach-to-stall training did not fully prepare the flight crew for an unexpected stall in the Q and did not address the actions that are needed to recover from a fully developed stall.

Those findings were immediately followed by the Board's "Probable Cause" statement: The captain's inappropriate response to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover.

Contributing to the accident were 1 the flight crew's failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the rising position of the low-speed cue, 2 the flight crew's failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures3 the captain's failure to effectively manage the flight, and 4 Colgan Air's inadequate procedures for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions.

She compared the twenty years that fatigue had remained on the NTSB's Most Wanted List of transportation safety improvements, during which there was no meaningful action taken by regulators in response, to the changes in tolerance for alcohol over the same period, noting that the impact on performance from fatigue and alcohol were similar. Hart and Board Member Robert L. Sumwalt, III dissented on the inclusion of fatigue as a contributing factor, on the grounds that there was not enough evidence to support such a conclusion.

It was noted that the same kind of pilot errors and standard operating procedure violations had been found in other accidents where fatigue was not a factor. I did not feel, therefore -- nor did the Board's majority -- that we had sufficient information or evidence to conclude that fatigue should be part of the probable cause of this accident.

  • Colgan Air Flight 3407

One of the most significant changes has already taken effect, changing the way examiners grade checkrides in flight simulators during stalls. The NTSB theorized that due to this low tolerance in a tested simulation environment, pilots may have come to fear loss of altitude in a stall and thus focused primarily on preventing such a loss, even to the detriment of recovering from the stall itself.