Source Materials The source literature on the psychology of deception is vast. Indeed, it spills well beyond the Attributions of deception in dating situations. Importantly, lying and deception do not end with a marriage license; infidelity is pervasive among some married “Attributions of Deception in Dating Situation. To date, there is insufficient conceptual research on the relationship between These factors are the following: (1) Protestant work ethic, (2) self-deception, thus more likely attribute absence to failings of the person rather than the situation.
The recent US government indictments of Chinese spies that will never be prosecuted, minor sanctions on an already isolated North Korea for hacking Sony, dithering in the wake of the Office of Personnel Management penetration, and advocacy for voluntary and unenforceable norms, moreover, undermine confidence that serious attacks will ever be adequately punished even if attribution is successful.
Scholars and policy analysts are generally pessimistic about cyber deterrence, noting considerable confusion about what the concept even means [ 1—3 ]. Deterrence theory distinguishes deterrence by denial, the threat that effective defenses will defeat an attack, from deterrence by punishment, the threat that costly retaliation will offset the benefits of a successful attack [ 4 ]. Cyberspace seems to undermine both strategies because offense is relatively easier than defense [ 5 ], and the attribution problem precludes reprisal, i.
Faced with a choice between bad alternatives, many argue that denial should be emphasized over punishment [ 910 ]. These arguments are not wrong, but they are incomplete. The technical challenges of attribution depend on critical organizational and political context that is making attribution, and thus deterrence, harder and easier along different dimensions [ 15 ].
Attackers depend on deception to obfuscate their identity, but they are more likely to make mistakes against complex targets while defenders are more likely to use deception themselves to protect the targets they most value [ 16 ]. Indeed, cyber operations are unsuited for coercive signaling for the same reasons that they are useful for marginal adjustments in the distribution of power, at modest scales where offensive deception is more likely to work.
Attribution and deterrence become feasible where defenders most need them to work, even as everyday failure is ubiquitous below the threshold of credible retaliation. Given that most attacks tend to fall on the lower end of the value spectrum, conducted for criminal gain, surveillance, or protest rather than physical combat [ 1718 ], it is unsurprising that many are skeptical of deterrence.
Yet deterrence failure here tells us little about the ability to deter attacks against higher value targets where the costs of attribution and retaliation relative to target value may be much less. The most significant attack on critical infrastructure to date, the Olympic Games operation against Iran, is notable for the restraint exercised by the actors, evidenced by an apparent goal of marginal disruption rather than catastrophic destruction, years of meticulous planning and surveillance, extensive efforts to avoid compromise and minimize collateral damage, and the significant power advantage of the USA over Iran to deter serious retaliation [ 19 ].
Modern Love: Scientific Insights from 21st Century Dating
The absence of evidence of serious attacks might be interpreted as evidence that deterrence is working to protect some of the most valuable targets, or simply that sufficiently capable actors do not perceive a benefit in attacking [ 8 ] Distinguishing between deterrence and disinterest in the cases of dogs that do not bark is a persistent difficulty in empirical deterrence research.
This article focuses on the theoretical feasibility of deterrence at scale. Cybersecurity is an inherently interdisciplinary problem because digital threats depend on both technology and incentives. The field of international relations IRs has a long tradition of understanding the sources of conflict and ways it can be avoided, so it is reasonable to leverage it to make sense of conflict in cyberspace [ 20—28 ].
Cybersecurity can also be a source of theoretical puzzles that can help to sharpen concepts within particular disciplines. Some scholars argue that cyberspace upends traditional theory altogether [ 29—32 ], but one need not go to such an extreme. The attribution problem, for instance, too often viewed through a technical lens with deterministic results for deterrence, can be grounded within IR theory to understand its implications for cyber conflict.
Conversely, although the effects of uncertainty about capabilities and interests are well understood in IR theory, anonymous attacks involve uncertainty about the very identity of the opponent. Anonymity is certainly not unique to cybersecurity, but its prevalence raises questions about how strategic bargaining works, and fails, in the digital domain.
This article leverages rationalist IR theory to both explain and bound the pessimism about cyber deterrence and incorporate the newly salient problem of attribution. I find that different assumptions about the costs of attribution and retaliation relative to target value lead to different conclusions about the effectiveness and coverage of deterrence by denial and punishment.
Modern Love: Scientific Insights from 21st Century Dating – Association for Psychological Science
I proceed in four parts. I first examine the effects of information asymmetry and commitment problems in cybersecurity. Next I introduce the challenge of anonymity and argue that the attribution problem is scale dependent. The third section uses a simple formal model to show how the recalcitrance of attribution and the feasibility of deterrence depend on assumptions about costs and value.
Few assumptions are needed to model the historical distribution of many low-value attacks and few to no high-value attacks. The concluding section discusses policy implications, arguing that toleration for low-level aggression is the price of credible deterrence against serious attacks.
Politics by cyber means Most IR scholars assume that political actors use war and threats of war instrumentally in the pursuit of political goals such as power, security, wealth, and status Mainstream realist and liberal approaches to IR share a rationalist assumption that actors compare costs and benefits when choosing a strategy. They differ mainly on the relative importance of the international balance of power versus domestic politics and institutions for structuring policymaker incentives.
Some constructivist or postmodern approaches dispute the rationality assumption, instead emphasizing the role of ideas, culture, and interpretation in the social construction of belligerent policy.
Because it is helpful to understand rational incentives for strategic behavior prior to assessing the relevance of departures, this article assumes that actors who employ cyber weapons tend to respond to incentives more or less rationally, although uncertainty is rife and actors make mistakes. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means …. This insight is captured in modern theories that treat conflict as a process of rational bargaining over some contested good [ 34—37 ].
This section applies this paradigm to cyber conflict, highlighting factors that both promote the use of covert intrusions to marginally alter the distribution of power but limit their utility for making coercive threats or major power adjustments.
Information and commitment The possibility of using force to alter the distribution of power can never be ruled out in anarchy, where there is no overarching political authority to adjudicate disputes and enforce agreements [ 38 ].
Even so, the outbreak of war is something of a puzzle if one assumes fighting is costly If war were attractive for its own sake there would be little question about why wars occur. Historically, some cultures have imbued war with positive ritualistic value [ 39 ]. Why should both sides decide to shed blood, waste treasure, and destroy some of the disputed resource through fighting when they could each be better off negotiating to revise or preserve the status quo in favor of stronger actor?
Two important answers are that information asymmetry and commitment problems lead to inefficient bargaining outcomes [ 35 ]. Actors might want to avoid war, but they also want a favorable distributional outcome, so they are likely bluff, conceal capabilities, and break promises. These problems are legion in cyberspace.
Uncertainty about power and resolve is one of the most important factors contributing to the outbreak of war [ 4041 ]. One or both actors may not understand, or be unable to credibly communicate, the true balance of power, the value they each place on the dispute, or the likely outcome of a conflict. Because both understand that the other has incentives to misrepresent strength to get a better deal without fighting, they are inclined to discount threats that might, if believed, correct the misunderstanding.
An actor whose power depends on secret plans or weapons, moreover, may be unable to make credible threats in a crisis because revelation would enable the opponent to develop countermeasures that nullify the advantage [ 42 ].
In SeptemberChina could not advertise that it had infiltrated over troops into North Korea, a fact that probably would have dissuaded US intervention. China warned the USA not to cross the 38th parallel, but American policymakers discounted the ambiguous threat and pushed north.
Japan likewise could not coerce the USA in with the threat of a devastating attack on Pearl Harbor because the Pacific Fleet would simply have reoriented its defenses to defeat the raid. Japan furthermore misjudged the resolve of the USA to wage total war to avenge the insult. False optimism thus leads one or both actors to prefer conflict over negotiation [ 4344 ].
Even with perfect information, actors may be unable to credibly commit to a deal because they have incentives to renege in the future [ 454647 ]. A declining state may prefer to fight a preventative war today rather than be forced to accept an undesirable peace tomorrow when the rising state will have more bargaining power.
Leaders may be unable to restrain their bureaucratic agents, proxy forces, or angry citizens from pressing attacks after a formal peace deal. Some worry that principal-agent problems are particularly dangerous in a cyber bureaucracy [ 48 ]. Victims of extortion may fear that giving in will merely encourage the challenger to demand more, or that the threatened harm will be inflicted even after appeasement e.
Conversely, an actor cannot commit to carry out a threat if she would suffer more by administering the punishment than the disputed object is worth. Credible nuclear threats, for instance, are hard to make because the costs of Armageddon outweigh any imaginable political benefit. Commitment problems can sometimes be addressed through institutions e. However, actors have trouble forming or sticking to an agreement if they have strong incentives to break it.3 Ways To Avoid Deceptive Women
Uncertainty and commitment problems often appear together. Schelling [ 50 ] points out that uncertainty may restore some credibility to excessively costly punishments i. Ironically, the possibility that an absolutely noncredible threat might not be exercised discounts its severity and enables an actor to create threatening situations where it might be exercised.
For the same reasons, ambiguity about minor punishments undermines the effectiveness of deterrence by eroding commitment — a major problem in cybersecurity discussed further below. The inability to distinguish offensive from defensive forces is another source of uncertainty about whether actors seek to preserve or revise the status quo [ 51 ], which then becomes an obstacle to committing to arms control agreements [ 52 ].
If they were distinguishable an actor might credibly advertise deterrence by denial without threatening other status quo actors, who could then agree to draw down offensive stockpiles.
Indistinguishability is a major problem in the cyber domain because defensive intelligence collection to clarify capabilities and interests is hard to differentiate from offensive reconnaissance and network subversion.
"Attributions of Deception in Dating Situations" by Joseph J. Benz, Mary K. Anderson et al.
Compromise for intelligence today could be disruptive attack tomorrow. This ambiguity is particularly dangerous if offense is believed to have important advantages over defense, as is widely, if erroneously, believed about cyberspace [ 53 ]. Psychological scientists have turned to online dating to examine how truthful people are in their descriptions of themselves, both with themselves and to others.
Online daters walk a fine line — everyone wants to make themselves as attractive as possible to potential dates, making deception very tempting. Catalina Toma, Jeffrey Hancock both at Cornell Universityand Nicole Ellison Michigan State University examined the relationship between actual physical attributes and online self-descriptions of online daters in New York.
They found that lying was ubiquitous, but usually fairly small in terms of magnitude. Men tended to lie about height and women tended to lie about weight. Another modern dating innovation may provide a better solution: Since then, speed dating has spread around the world, giving millions of singles a chance at love.
It also gives savvy researchers an unprecedented chance to study attraction in situ. This hunch was confirmed by a speed dating outing with several other Northwestern colleagues, and the researchers embarked a new track of speed dating work. No word on whether the outing was a success from other standpoints. As Finkel and Eastwick point out in a study published in Current Directions in Psychological Science, the popularity of speed dating allows the collection of large, real world samples across cultures, ethnicities, and socioeconomic levels.
The speed dating design also lets researchers to study both sides of a dyadic process. Also, speed dating allows for exploring reciprocity effects. A Psychological Science article Eastwick et al. It also allows for testing actual versus stated preferences. One speed dating study showed that stated preferences do not match actual preferences and called into question the gender biases in attraction that have been well-documented elsewhere i.
Speed dating studies also allow researchers to study the implications of simple changes in dating paradigms. This idea holds true at speed dating events, where women generally stay seated while the men rotate. This set-up stems from vague notions of chivalry, but also from more mundane purposes — according to one speed dating company executive, women tend to have more stuff with them, like purses, and are therefore less efficient movers.
Could this set-up in itself affect attraction? Turns out that it can. In most speed dating scenarios as in most attraction scenarios in general women are more selective. But, when women rotated, this effect disappeared and they became less selective than the men. T he search for love is never easy and attraction is never simple. Research into online matchmaking and speed dating is providing valuable insight into the human quest for romance, and this is only the beginning.
Most of the research in this area to-date focuses on dating behavior of heterosexuals in the United States. More work is necessary to determine if the findings so far also apply to international daters and to understand the dynamics of homosexual pairings. Emerging methods may also bring new insight into dating dynamics. Finkel and Eastwick have begun using a coding scheme to study exactly what participants are saying during their dates, allowing them to potentially code what exactly makes a date great or awkward.
Is it better to communicate independence from or interdependence with your partner? References and Further Reading Eastwick, P. Selective versus unselective romantic desire: Not all reciprocity is created equal. Psychological Science, 18, — Sex differences in mate preferences revisited: Do people know what they initially desire in a romantic partner? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, Arbitrary social norms influence sex differences in romantic selectivity.
Psychological Science, 20, Current Directions in Psychological Science, 17, Homophily in online dating: When do you like someone like yourself?
Assessing attractiveness in online dating profiles. People, profiles, contacts, and replies in online dating. Self-presentation in online personals: The role of anticipated future interaction, self-disclosure, and perceived success in Internet dating. Communication Research, 33, Matching and sorting in online dating. What makes you click: