Air France Flight 'Damn it, we’re going to crash’ - Telegraph
Simulation of flight AF in the Eurocat system is covered by the dates of issue of the Airbus A and A type rating as well as. Horrific details of the last moments of Flight have emerged in a his girlfriend the night before, leaving inexperienced Pierre-Cedric Bonin. With the report into the tragedy of Air France due next month, Airbus's The company has sold 11, aircraft to date, with 7, in the air. The transcript of increasingly panicky conversations in the cockpit suggests.
During the next 30 seconds, the aircraft rolled alternately left and right as Bonin adjusted to the altered handling characteristics of his aircraft. This action was unnecessary and excessive under the circumstances. The aircraft's angle of attack increased, and the aircraft started to climb above its cruising level of FL The icing event had lasted for just over a minute.
The trimmable horizontal stabilizer THS moved from three to 13 degrees nose-up in about one minute, and remained in that latter position until the end of the flight. As the aircraft began to descend, the angle of attack rapidly increased toward 30 degrees.
A second consequence of the reconfiguration into alternate law was that stall protection no longer operated. Whereas in normal law, the aircraft's flight management computers would have acted to prevent such a high angle of attack, in alternate law this did not happen.
Air France Flight 447: 'Damn it, we’re going to crash’
Indeed, the switch into alternate law occurred precisely because the computers, denied reliable speed data, were no longer able to provide such protection — nor many of the other functions expected of normal law. Noticing the various alarms going off, he urgently asked the two crew members: The stall warnings stopped, as all airspeed indications were now considered invalid by the aircraft's computer due to the high angle of attack. Roughly 20 seconds later, at From there until the end of the flight, the angle of attack never dropped below 35 degrees.
From the time the aircraft stalled until its impact with the ocean, the engines were primarily developing either percent N1 or TOGA thrust, though they were briefly spooled down to about 50 percent N1 on two occasions. The engines always responded to commands and were developing in excess of percent N1 when the flight ended.
First officer Robert responded with: Shortly thereafter, the Ground proximity warning system sounded an alarm, warning the crew about the aircraft's now imminent crash with the ocean. Bonin, realizing the situation was now hopeless, said: We're going to crash! This can't be true. Its pitch was During its descent, the aircraft had turned more than degrees to the right to a compass heading of degrees.
The Airbus was destroyed on impact; all passengers and crew on board were killed instantly by extreme trauma. Its final position report at Gravitational stalled glide does not allow timeouts, to thoroughly discuss the situation to find out what went wrong.
If they did not understand the instruments, then instead of pondering on it they should have come to the quick conclusion that they did not understand those instruments, and apply the unreliable airspeed procedure clearly prescribed for that situation, which is a blind, given thrust and pitch setting for the given configuration, and let the airplane fly itself, and only after get to analyzing what went wrong, and by the time they finished, the root-cause pitot icing would have probably cured itself.
Air France Flight - Wikipedia
It was the safe solution to the problem, but not applied. The Airbus A performed exactly as it was designed and described when the stall warning cut out at the end of valid values, except the co-pilots did not know it. Every modern airplane is quite a confusing piece of machinery. Airbus A is a new generation, highly automated piece of equipment with drastically simplified controls, displays, and instrumentation compared to older models.
Still, pilots with the same human capabilities as the ones on Air France flight could very well stay in full control in those planes, and many times acted heroically saving situations much graver than where the plight of Air France flight started, such as United Airlines flight UA at Sioux City, or Air Canada flight AC, the Gimli Glider.
If those pilots could perform well in those older, much more complicated aircraft in tougher situations, then there is no excuse for the co-pilots of AF flight to be confused in a generally much simpler and easier-to-fly aircraft. The Airbus A is a digital fly-by-wire aircraft as the flight control surfaces are moved by electrical and hydraulic actuators controlled by a digital computer.
The computer interprets pilot commands via input from a side-stick, making adjustments on its own to keep the plane stable and on course, which is particularly useful after engine failure by allowing the pilots to concentrate on engine restart and landing planning.
It was an Airbus A with the same side-stick control, and it matched up with the hardest situation very well with an experienced 57 year old Captain Chesley Sullenberger at the command. The Airbus A is not a video-game airplane, it is the airlines that make it a video-game by cutting corners, taking advantage of its superior automated capabilities thinking that it flies by itself, and no training and no knowledge of even the basics of the principles of flying is required in them for their pilots, as was demonstrated by the co-pilots of flightwho seemed to be incapable to react even on a basic level to the phenomenon of the aerodynamic stall.
The co-pilots had not applied the unreliable airspeed procedure.
The co-pilots apparently did not notice that the plane had reached its maximum permissible altitude. The co-pilots did not read out the available data like vertical velocity, altitude, etc.Fatal Flight 447: Chaos in the Cockpit
The stall warning sounded continuously for 54 seconds.